International Doctoral Program in Asia-Pacific Studies

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Understanding how middle-power states navigate intensifying great power competition has become imperative of contemporary international relations. These dynamics were the focus of a book launch and lecture delivered by Dr. Yves Tiberghien, Adjunct Chair Professor of IDAS at NCCU and Professor of Political Science at the University of British Columbia, held on 23 March 2026 at National Chengchi University (NCCU). The event, organized by the International Doctoral Program in Asia-Pacific Studies (IDAS), featured his latest book, The Hedgers: How the Global South Navigates the Sino-American Competition, followed by a talk on recent electoral developments in Japan titled “The Surprising New Voter Patterns Behind the Big Takaichi Victory.” Dr. Tiberghien’s lecture addressed a central question in contemporary global politics: how Global South middle powers respond to and shape a rapidly evolving international order. He characterized the current moment as a period of accelerated historical transformation—an interregnum in which the established order is eroding. In this environment of heightened uncertainty and instability, middle powers are no longer passive rule-takers but increasingly active agents shaping the trajectory of global politics. The book advances three central arguments. First, periods of global order transition create expanded strategic space for middle powers. As power diffuses across the international system, these states gain opportunities not only to maneuver between major powers but also to influence outcomes and reshape incentives. Second, the rise of Global South middle powers is closely tied to the diffusion of economic and political power. The growing economic weight of the Global South has fundamentally altered the structure of the international system. Third, these states have developed active hedging strategies, rejecting the notion that hedging is merely a temporary posture. Instead, they engage in deliberate, multidirectional strategies designed to maximize autonomy, expand influence, and accelerate the emergence of a more multipolar order. Dr. Tiberghien emphasized that the current international system is best understood as a hybrid order, combining elements of unipolarity, bipolar rivalry, and emerging multipolarity. This hybrid structure creates fluidity and uncertainty, offering middle powers increased opportunities for strategic maneuver. Unlike the rigid bipolarity of the Cold War, the present system allows states greater flexibility to pursue independent foreign policies, resist alignment pressures, and challenge existing institutional arrangements. This is a key implication for the transformation of Japan’s political landscape that delivered Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s unprecedented 2/3 majority in Japan’s lower house in February 2026. As critical global events contributed significantly in shaping electoral consideration, with opposing pressures from the US and China. The election also saw a rare coalition between conservative voters and young undecided voters, as well as female voters that overwhelmingly supported Takaichi. The result was a major realignment in Japanese politics. Both lectures highlighted the broader systemic impact of an increasingly challenged international order on the behavior of middle power states, and their domestic implications. While hedging strategies provide political maneuverability, they also contribute to alliance conundrums forcing major reconsideration of government priorities. Dr. Tiberghien further underscored the importance of ideational factors in shaping foreign policy behavior and developing domestic political support. The rise of digitally and politically engaged young voters can transform domestic expectations, making governments more responsive to national identity and public opinion. During the open forum, international and domestic students posed questions inquiring deeper into the perspective of states on the rules-based international order. Dr. Tiberghein described those certain aspects of the existing international order was appreciated by the global south states but not all. As these states were not a unified actor, but only coalesced at certain points of agreement. A similar inquiry was asked about Japan’s election results, which sought to understand the geographic divide in Japanese politics. The results showed, according to Dr. Tiberghien, that the LDP were more successful in winning back the urban vote, as well as winning a comprehensive electoral support across the country. In conclusion, the lectures provided a compelling account of how Global South middle powers are navigating and reshaping a period of profound international transformation. By highlighting the interplay of structural change, strategic agency, and evolving global norms, Dr. Tiberghien’s work offers important insights into the future of global order and the increasingly central role of middle powers in shaping it.

On 2 March 2026, International Doctoral Program on Asia-Pacific Studies (IDAS) hosted a guest lecture by Dr. Yves Tiberghien, Adjunct University Chair Professor at IDAS, NCCU, and Professor of Political Science at University of British Columbia. The lecture, titled “The Surprising Effects of the Trump Shock on the Global Order: Losers, Winners, and Strategic Dynamics,” examined the systemic consequences of recent shifts in U.S. foreign policy under the Trump 2.0 administration and their impact on the evolving international order. Dr. Tiberghien began by arguing that the current international system is not fundamentally broken but rather “ruptured.” This distinction provides an important conceptual lens to rethink contemporary developments in IR and IPE. According to him, the rules and institutions of the liberal international order have been deeply shaken by recent political developments, particularly the policy direction associated with the return of Donald Trump to power. To contextualize these developments historically, Dr. Tiberghien referred to the words of John Ikenberry of Princeton University, who described how the United States became the “owner and operator” of the liberal capitalist system supporting the institutions of liberal internationalism while enjoying special privileges. The U.S. not only built the post Cold War international order but also benefited from a privileged position within it. However, Dr. Tiberghien argued that recent U.S. policies, including reduced commitment to multilateral institutions and international agreements, have gradually eroded trust in American leadership. In analyzing developments over the past year, Dr. Tiberghien categorized them into surprises and puzzles. One major surprise was the revival of a “G2” dynamic between the United States and China. The tone in Washington toward Beijing has shifted toward a more transactional and business-oriented approach, reflecting Trump’s deal-making style. Another surprising outcome concerns global trade patterns. Despite tariffs, sanctions, and geopolitical tensions, global trade did not experience a major decline and remained relatively resilient. He also highlighted the rapid increase in investment in artificial intelligence. According to his analysis, tariff policies and geopolitical competition have indirectly stimulated massive investment in advanced technologies. He also discussed the debate between the U.S. Department of Defense and the AI company Anthropic over highly autonomous military technologies. Concerns have emerged regarding the development of automated AI weapons capable of large-scale destruction and mass surveillance. Anthropic reportedly released a detailed statement addressing the ethical implications of such technologies, illustrating tensions between innovation and societal safety. Despite global turbulence, some countries have navigated these changes relatively well. Notably, Vietnam and several Southeast Asian states have demonstrated resilience. Vietnam’s “bamboo diplomacy,” characterized by flexible balancing and hedging between major powers, has allowed it to manage geopolitical pressure effectively. Similarly, India was described as a “hedger in chief,” employing micro-hedging strategies to maintain strategic autonomy. Dr. Tiberghien referred to the August 2025 Tianjin meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, where leaders including Narendra Modi, Xi Jinping, and Vladimir Putin demonstrated diplomatic engagement suggesting potential rule-making coalitions. Dr. Tiberghien then examined broader geoeconomic outcomes. He praised the efforts of the ASEAN, which continues to promote regional stability. In 2025, Southeast Asia experienced comparatively positive geoeconomic outcomes. He noted that China and India are accelerating technological development in response to U.S. leadership in AI, while Taiwan and South Korea remain resilient due to their roles in global technology supply chains. Taiwan, in particular, plays a crucial role in advanced semiconductor manufacturing. Recognizing this strategic importance, Taiwanese policymakers increasingly adopt a geoeconomic approach in their engagement with the U.S. Some Northern allies face greater challenges. While Japan has maintained political stability under PM Takaichi, relations between Japan and China have become more strained, particularly following statements regarding Taiwan. The global governance of emerging technologies remains fragmented. Although the EU has pioneered regulatory initiatives such as the AI Act, international coordination has stalled, resulting in a deadlock in global AI governance. Dr. Tiberghien emphasized that the world faces systemic risks associated with fragmented digital rules and shifting power dynamics. Drawing on theories of systemic power transition and hegemonic realism, he argued that transitions between hegemonic and rising powers historically produce shocks throughout the international system.  In his concluding remarks, Dr. Tiberghien quoted Mark Carney at the 2026 World Economic Forum in Davos: “The middle powers must act together.” Despite recent shocks, he concluded that the international system has largely been able to absorb disruptions without widespread catastrophe. During the Q&A session, discussions addressed hedging strategies, technological competition, AI governance, and middle-power leverage. Dr. Tiberghien emphasized that states increasingly adopt diverse and flexible hedging strategies, making rigid categorization difficult. Successful middle powers identify niche capabilities and become indispensable within the system. In this regard, he highlighted Taiwan’s semiconductor industry as a key example. Finally, he encouraged younger scholars to study historical “periods of destruction and transformation” and suggested that intellectual detachment combined with creativity and compassion can help scholars navigate the uncertainties of contemporary international relations.

On 16 December 2025, NCCU’s International Doctoral Program on Asia-Pacific Studies (IDAS) hosted a guest lecture by Dr. Jefferey Chiu (Co-Founder and CEO of AnsForce; Adjunct Professor at TIIPM, NCCU School of Business) titled “Semiconductor Industry and Challenge to Taiwan’s Technology Development.” The lecture explained, in technical but accessible terms, why semiconductor progress is the enabling foundation of the current AI surge. Dr. Chiu stressed that contemporary advances in AI are tightly constrained by hardware realities such as compute availability, energy efficiency, thermal stability, and manufacturable performance at scale rather than by algorithms alone. Using recent TSMC- and Nvidia-related forum materials as illustrative anchors, he connected the engineering logic of leading-edge fabrication to the broader issue of technological capability, arguing that TSMC’s strategic importance derives not from abstract narratives, but from accumulated process integration capacity and yield reliability at extreme dimensions. A central theme was that modern chipmaking has moved beyond the simplistic story of “smaller transistors.” Dr. Chiu framed leading-edge manufacturing as a systems discipline combining process technology, device architecture, materials engineering, and increasingly advanced packaging. At the frontier, production is executed at near-atomic tolerances, where minor defects, contamination, or overlay misalignment can sharply reduce yield and erase theoretical performance gains. In this sense, technological leadership is inseparable from the ability to translate design intent into stable mass production. Dr. Chiu argued that this is why semiconductor competitiveness is so concentrated globally: only a small set of firms can coordinate the full stack of tooling, materials, metrology, and process control required for high-volume production at the newest nodes. The technical core of the talk focused on TSMC’s leading logic roadmap N3 (3nm), N2 (2nm), and A16 (1.6nm-class) and the architectural transitions that make each node relevant for AI-era computing. Dr. Chiu explained that N3 remains based on FinFET technology, a 3D transistor structure designed to improve gate control and suppress leakage relative to planar transistors. He emphasized that N3’s significance is not limited to nominal feature size: it is strategically valuable because it can be manufactured at scale with high reliability, supporting the production of today’s demanding AI accelerators where power-performance balance and yield predictability are decisive. In his account, N3 demonstrates how a mature, deployable node can remain central to frontier computing even when newer architectures are being developed, because scale production and consistency are prerequisites for real-world AI capacity. He described N2 as a more substantial inflection point because it introduces Gate-All-Around (GAA) nanosheet transistors for mass production. Dr. Chiu framed the transition as a response to the physics limits of continued FinFET scaling: as dimensions shrink further, maintaining electrostatic control and acceptable leakage becomes increasingly difficult. GAA nanosheet designs, by surrounding the channel more effectively and enabling tunable channel geometries through stacked nanosheets, can restore control and efficiency improvements needed for the next generation of AI chips. Importantly, he emphasized that N2’s promise is inseparable from manufacturing complexity: nanosheet architectures raise integration demands across materials, etch processes, variability control, and metrology, meaning their strategic value depends on whether they can be produced reliably, not simply demonstrated. Furthermore, A16 was presented as addressing an additional bottleneck that becomes acute as AI accelerators grow denser and more power-hungry. He summarized the node progression as a constraint-resolution sequence: FinFET-based N3 supports reliable high-yield scaling; GAA nanosheets at N2 restore leakage control and efficiency when FinFET approaches saturation; and A16-class power-delivery innovations mitigate electrical bottlenecks that would otherwise cap performance growth in dense AI hardware. Across these discussions, Dr. Chiu repeatedly underscored a broader conclusion: semiconductors enable AI’s expansion by sustaining performance-per-watt gains through architectural reinvention even as classical scaling assumptions weaken. The Q&A then widened the lens to Taiwan’s position in global supply chains and the way TSMC’s overseas investments and partnerships such as U.S. fab expansion and ecosystem coordination reflect shifting supply-chain strategies amid intensifying geopolitical competition. In sum, the lecture demonstrated that understanding chip-level innovation and manufacturability is essential for analyzing contemporary technological power, particularly in an AI era where compute, yield, and supply-chain resilience increasingly shape both economic outcomes and security-relevant capability.  

Understanding how small states navigate intensifying great power competition has gained urgency. This was the focus of the lecture delivered by Professor of Political Science and International Relations at University of Canterbury, Dr. Alex C. Tan, titled “Structure, Geography, and Agency: New Zealand and its management of Great Power relationships” held on 16 December 2025. The lecture was organized by National Chengchi University’s (NCCU) International Doctoral Program on Asia-Pacific Studies (IDAS). Dr. Tan examined New Zealand’s management of relations with China and the United States amid escalating strategic rivalry, using the case to illuminate broader patterns in how small states respond to systemic pressures. He framed the dilemma as one shaped by the “gravitational pull” of competing interests: economic interests dependent on China and security commitments tied to the US. As competition intensifies, the space for an independent foreign policy becomes increasingly constrained, narrowing New Zealand’s room to strategically maneuver. While New Zealand faces no immediate military threat, it has alliance commitments to the US. At the same time, New Zealand’s integration into the Asia-Pacific economy is mostly through its economic relationship with China. China is New Zealand’s largest trade partner, which has become a key source of economic dependence. This asymmetry creates a persistent tension between economic interests and security alignments. To analyze this dynamic, Dr. Tan introduced an analytical framework around three concepts: structure, geography, and agency. Structurally, small states are “price takers” in the international system, compelled to reassess their strategies as shifts in global power distributions occur. Geographically, New Zealand’s physical isolation acts as both a shield and a constraint, reinforcing its maritime dependence and shaping a South Pacific identity distinct from that of Asia. Geography plays a critical role in New Zealand’s strategic outlook. Physical distance has historically served as a security asset, enabling low defense spending and fostering a relatively relaxed threat perception. At the same time, this geographic isolation has become a liability in an era of globalization, leaving New Zealand highly vulnerable to supply-chain disruptions. Globalization has eroded the protective value of distance, New Zealand finds itself increasingly exposed to external shocks. In terms of agency, Dr. Tan emphasized the role of domestic leadership, institutional capacity, and political consensus in enabling policy innovation within external constraints. While small states are neither fully determined by structure nor are they entirely free to shape outcomes. They retain limited but meaningful room for maneuver. New Zealand’s agency is most visible in its tradition of creative diplomacy. Dr. Tan highlighted policy innovations such as New Zealand’s strong anti-nuclear legislation as examples of value-based autonomy. Historically, New Zealand has been able to “punch above its weight” diplomatically through innovation and soft power rather than material capabilities. However, Dr. Tan cautioned that this space for maneuver is shrinking as structural constraints intensify. A fundamental tension now defines New Zealand’s strategic environment: security arrangements increasingly demand conformity, while economic relationships require flexibility. China’s expanding footprint in the South Pacific further complicates this balance, introducing strategic competition into what New Zealand once viewed as its own backyard. As geographic isolation no longer provides a reliable buffer, Wellington’s strategic leverage has become more limited. Dr. Tan concluded that while structure and geography set boundaries, these do not determine all outcomes. Agency enables small states to expand autonomy through innovation. Nonetheless, no degree of diplomatic creativity, he argued, can fully offset increasingly binding structural constraints in the international system. During the open forum, discussion turned to issues of illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing and their implications for national security. Dr. Tan noted that IUU fishing predates China’s rise but has become more salient as economic security and livelihoods are increasingly politicized. He also addressed New Zealand’s limited naval capacity, observing that the country’s navy largely performs coast guard–type functions and that the country lacks a dedicated coast guard despite possessing one of the world’s largest exclusive economic zones (EEZ). Dr. Tan suggested that a “white hull” approach focused on maritime patrol could allow New Zealand to meet alliance obligations by securing its regional “backyard,” thereby enabling larger partners to concentrate on forward deployments. In conclusion, the lecture offered a nuanced account of the constraints and possibilities confronting small states in an era of intensified great power rivalry. By highlighting the interplay of structure, geography, and agency, Dr. Tan provided attendees with a deeper understanding of the strategic dilemmas shaping New Zealand’s foreign policy choices and, more broadly, the challenges facing small states navigating an increasingly contested international order. The students gained a lot from the talk. Next year, Dr. Tan will serve as an adjunct professor and will be offering courses in IDAS. We look forward to him bringing students a broader perspective and wider horizons.

Changing international systems require a transformation in the conduct of foreign policy – a salient point of discussion as smaller states contend with shifting regional dynamics. Professor of Indo-Pacific Studies in Korea National Diplomatic Academy, Dr. Wongi Choe, presented the governing factors in South Korea’s shift in foreign policy, “South Korea’s Evolving Regional Outlook and Strategic Toward the Indo-Pacific” held on 26 November 2025. The lecture was organized by National Chengchi University’s (NCCU) International Doctoral Program on Asia-Pacific Studies (IDAS). Dr. Choe began by situating South Korea’s foreign policy transformation within its historical and geographical context. Traditionally, South Korea’s geopolitical perception has been characterized by a sense of vulnerability—viewing itself as a small nation surrounded by great powers. However, this perspective is going through a period of adjustment. South Korea is reimagining its geopolitical role not as a silent observer but as a strategic pivot in the Indo-Pacific region. He outlined the key challenges confronting South Korea: maintaining political and economic independence amid powerful neighbors, sustaining prosperity, upholding democratic values, and managing the persistent threat posed by North Korea. Dr. Choe emphasized that South Korea’s regional strategy is deeply influenced by its polarized domestic politics, where progressive and conservative factions have diverging positions on the country’s strategic direction. Historically, South Korea’s foreign policy exhibited a form of “strategic myopia,” narrowly focused on the Korean Peninsula and focused on managing great-power dynamics. This limited horizon led to indifference toward broader regional security concerns and a lack of responsibility for regional stability. However, recent developments have necessitated an expansion of South Korea’s strategic outlook, prompting a recalibration of its foreign policy. A major turning point came in 2017, following China’s economic retaliation against Seoul’s deployment of the U.S. Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system by imposing informal economic sanctions. This episode revealed the vulnerabilities of South Korea’s economic dependence on China, demonstrating economic interdependence could easily be transformed into a coercive tool. In response, South Korea launched the New Southern Policy (2017–2022) to diversify its economic relations toward the emerging markets of Southeast Asia and India. Building upon this foundation, the Indo-Pacific Strategy (2022–2025) marks a decisive strategic transformation underscoring South Korea’s commitment to a rules-based international order and its intention to deepen ties with like-minded states. It highlights the growing importance of maritime security, particularly in protecting vital sea lines of communication (SLOCs) and upholding the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). These developments reflect Seoul’s strategic awakening and a newfound sense of confidence in contributing to the liberal international order that enabled its prosperity. Dr. Choe observed that this transformation reflects South Korea’s desire to recalibrate its bilateral relations with China toward a more reciprocal and balanced footing. This sentiment captures the shifting public perception in South Korea, particularly among younger generations, who increasingly view China with skepticism. The broader economic realignment away from Chinese dependence further reinforces this trend. During the forum discussion, participants explored whether South Korea could overcome its historical and political obstacles to cooperate more effectively with Japan, especially as external challenges mount. Dr. Choe noted that sustained progress would require overcoming entrenched partisan divisions within South Korea’s domestic politics. Regarding South Korea’s relations with Europe, he noted that continued engagement with NATO and European partners will likely depend on how Seoul manages its complex relationship with China. He noted that South Korea’s new approach to diplomacy is not confrontational but maturation to the point it can express strategic preferences. In conclusion, the lecture presented a compelling set of international political conundrums faced by a state going through a change in its perception of its own position in the international system, while navigating a volatile geopolitical situation. The attendees gained an understanding on the broader geopolitical consequences on the contested terrain of international foreign policy. These discussions underscored the need for continued critical inquiry into the political dilemma of diplomatic relations in an ever-contested international system.  

AI derived systems have profoundly transformed the conduct of warfare. This is particularly salient for the campaign to regulate AI weapons with implications to the ethics and legal concerns of human culpability. It is our honor to have Dr. Jeremy Moses, the Associate Professor of Political Science and International Relations, dissects the landscape of political debate over AI weapons in his lecture “The Meaninglessness of ‘Meaningful Human Control’: Learning from Israel’s Use of Military AI” held on 06 November 2025. The lecture was organized by National Chengchi University’s (NCCU) International Doctoral Program on Asia-Pacific Studies (IDAS). Dr. Moses argues that the commonly invoked concept of “meaningful human control” over AI-enabled weapons is effectively devoid of substantive value. His main argument is that human control is meaningless in the face of a permissive policy of casualties. Israel's lenient policies regarding civilian harm is producing the kind of war political leaders want. A central case study in the lecture is Israel’s deployment of AI systems in military operations, particularly in Gaza as a laboratory for testing new Israeli weaponry. Israel’s military technologies—tested in live combat—have enabled its defense industry to assert global competitiveness. These systems integrate vast quantities of metadata to identify targets, often designating individuals as legitimate threats based on tenuous associations. Dr. Moses contends that flawed algorithms not only manufacture “guilt” but also construct the very idea of “the enemy.” Moreover, permissive policies toward civilian casualties and the deliberate designation of populated areas as empty contribute to accusations of genocidal intent. For Dr. Moses, these AI systems do not control political actors; rather, they serve to legitimize policies already aligned with political objectives. Questioning if the concept of “meaningful human control” would actually minimize casualty. He asserts the human aspect of designing and implementing AI systems, which points the problem not at technology itself but the human decision to wage war in a particular way. The existing conversation around the campaign to regulate autonomous weapons systems has an inherent confusion in its position and a misdiagnosis of the problem, as the problem is human not machine. As the concept of meaningful control means nothing in a situation where war is being driven by genocidal politics.   The discussion also explored the implications for Taiwan. Dr. Moses highlighted the appeal of Israeli AI technologies for states engaged in asymmetric warfare, particularly for enhancing speed, surveillance, and targeting. However, he cautioned that close alignment with Israel carries reputational risks, as Israel is increasingly perceived internationally as a “toxic brand.” For Taiwan, a state that seeks to project a rights-respecting image, adopting such technologies may undermine its international legitimacy and, by extension, its security.  In the forum, when asked about the development of the argument for meaningful control, Dr. Moses responds about the dangers of the argument questioning if one way of inflicting casualty was more dignified than another, what differentiates a person pulling the trigger versus a machine. The succeeding questions concerned levels of oversight and responsibility. The core of the conversation focused on the abstract principle of responsibility, which historically has been held by leadership. As Dr. Moses emphasized that debates about AI in warfare are less about technological efficiency and more about political intent. Moving on the construction of a regulatory framework, in particular the corporation’s participation, Dr. Moses notes that the participation of corporations is channeled through think tanks, indicated by the cross over of corporate marketing and legal debate. When asked whether democracies might use such technologies more responsibly than authoritarian regimes, he argued that most likely and effective employment of AI is not warfare, but as a part of domestic social control.   In conclusion, the lecture presented a compelling set of social conundrums for attendees to grapple with as ethical dilemmas presented by AI-assisted warfare and the broader societal consequences of delegating life-and-death decisions to algorithms become more pervasive. Students and participants gained deeper insight into the contested terrain of military innovation, responsibility, and human dignity. These discussions underscore the need for continued critical inquiry into the political and moral dimensions of regulating new technologies.

The ongoing humanitarian crisis in Gaza has profoundly affected the discourse on the politics of Isreali-Palestinian support, whether at a global politics lens, domestic partisanship or a question of personal moral standing tensions have risen. This is the context of the 2025 Taipei International Peace Forum contends with its campus series, “Speaking Through Brutality: When a Gazan meets an Israeli,” presented by the Long Yitai Cultural Foundation held on 24 September 2025. The event was organized by the National Chengchi University’s (NCCU) International Doctoral Program on Asia-Pacific Studies (IDAS). Presenting the Israeli perspective is Roi Silberberg, Director of the School for Peace at Neve Shalom – Wahat al-Salam, describing his journey from a Zionist upbringing to becoming a peace educator. He spoke about the highly militaristic culture permeating the daily life of Israelis, and the transformation that comes from learning through dialogue. He spoke about the School of Peace, as a rare example where Jews and Palestinians live together as equals, through shared leadership and bilingual education. A place where dialogue and cohabitation create foundations linking peacebuilding to practical initiatives. They have assisted in the reconstruction of lost Palestinian places as focal points for memory and community. However, he states that facilitating dialogue at this moment is uniquely difficult. Political repression has intensified, especially for Palestinians, but also for Jews. Freedom of speech and assembly are more constrained. Participants arrive fearful about speaking openly but at the same time, many people feel this is not a moment for dialogue; yet those who do come feel a powerful urgency and often carry unrealistic expectations. For him, the task is to clarify what dialogue and training can and cannot do, and to focus together on meaningful, realistic action. Speaking from the Palestinian perspective, Hazem Almassry, a postdoctoral researcher and writer from Gaza. Hazam connects his personal life to the broader Palestinian struggle. Tracing the historical roots of the modern Israeli-Palestinian conflict through occupation, forced removal, and manufactured hardship, Hazam lays bare the daily realities of the people of Gaza. Through personal loss, Hazam narrates the unprecedented scale of violence that erupted following October 7, 2023, as today Palestinians live with daily killings and starvation. For Hassan, peace under occupation is not peace, it is submission, and without real pressure on Israel and genuine accountability, nothing will change. Palestinians continue to live between moments of warmth and joy, and the deep affliction of political violence. The balance is fragile, and the storm is never far away. In the open forum, students emphasized that the situation should be recognized as genocide rather than merely a “conflict,” emphasizing that this has been an ongoing process for decades. Speaking truth to power, and calling atrocities for what they really are. This has proven difficult as powerful countries continue to deny proper action to help the Palestinians. When asked about similar initiatives in other places particularly in Palestinian territory, Roi explained that joint initiatives face skepticism among Palestinians due to concerns about “normalization,” which refers to working too closely with the “enemy.” As within Palestinian society engaging in joint initiatives is considered a betrayal of the Palestinian struggle. Furthermore, as Palestinian territories face institutional collapse it increases the difficulty to sustain dialogue initiatives. When asked about their desired outcomes for a final political solution, Hazem preferred a one-state solution with equal rights but would accept two states if it guaranteed independence. But Hazam acknowledges the difficulties to reach either of these outcomes, as Israel does not want either option and a political consensus has been reached within Israel. Roi supports any viable solution, but stresses that stopping violence and ending the illusion of exclusivity must come first. At the present moment, Roi laments we are far from any real discussion of solutions. In conclusion, the dialogue revealed starkly different lived realities yet a shared desire to end violence and achieve dignity. Both speakers underscored the importance of dialogue, though they acknowledged immense challenges given the ongoing violence, mistrust, and international inaction. As the war continues to severely impact the already critical humanitarian situation in the Gaza Strip, a cession of violence is just the first step towards a path to sustainable peace and security for all Palestinians and Israelis. To break the cycle of violence, the international community must push for an agreement that respects the lives, dignity and future of Israelis and Palestinians equally.

As geopolitical tensions escalate and conflicts become more complex, the role of civilian resilience has never been more critical. National Chengchi University’s (NCCU) International Doctoral Program on Asia-Pacific Studies (IDAS) hosted a timely lecture “Civilian Resilience in Times of Crisis: European and Taiwanese Perspectives,” which was presented by Senator Pavel Fischer, Chairman of the Czech Senate’s Foreign Affairs, Defense and Security Committee, and Legislator Yeong-Kang Chen, the former Deputy Defense Minister. The event was held on March 14, 2025, with assistance from the Czech-Taiwanese Business Chamber. Senator Fischer explained that the Czech Republic’s understanding and practice of “resilience” had been shaped by the past 30 years of recurring floods and extreme weather events. These experiences have led to the development of a robust crisis response system in which connectivity between ministries is key and societal resilience plays a central role. He also recalled instances in which Taiwan provided timely humanitarian aid to the Czech Republic during disasters, reflecting a valuable spirit of international friendship and cooperation. However, he acknowledged that the Czech Republic’s current crisis management system does not yet systematically incorporate responses to external threats. He emphasized that the Ukraine’s demonstrated ability to integrate national defense with local crisis management, along with its use of early-warning technologies, provides a model that the Czech Republic should strive to emulate. Senator Fischer further pointed out that Russia’s hybrid warfare strategy has expanded beyond military action to include information and psychological dimensions that aim to erode public trust in democratic governments and weaken civic cohesion. In actual fact, some religious organizations in the Czech Republic remain under Russian influence, and misinformation on social media also threatens societal stability. These challenges underscore the difficulties that democratic societies face in relation to institutional integration and cross-sectoral collaboration. Moreover, Senator Fischer emphasized that, in times of crisis, it is the leaders’ responsibility to honestly inform the public about the crisis, thereby enabling citizens to correctly understand the situation and related government messages, and avoid being manipulated by hostile forces that would seek to disrupt. Only by integrating military and civil defense systems and establishing effective early-warning and response mechanisms can societies enhance their overall resilience to threats. As for Taiwan, Legislator Chen also drew from the lessons of the war in Ukraine and emphasized that Taiwan must simultaneously strengthen both its military defense and societal resilience when facing sudden crises. He pointed out that modern warfare extends beyond traditional military conflict to include domains such as energy, communications, logistics, and social systems. At present, Taiwan lacks a comprehensive framework for national security and societal stability, and its inter-agency coordination is inadequate. Government policies tend to focus on economic development and climate change, without fully integrating national security considerations. While the government has proposed raising the defense budget to 3% of GDP, he also argued that long-term investments in social infrastructure and disaster preparedness—particularly in terms of regional coordination and infrastructure reinforcement—are even more critical. Legislator Chen further noted that Taiwan is heavily dependent on imported energy, and its power grid is both dense and fragile. An attack could paralyze communications, financial systems, and essential services. Taiwan currently has only 14 undersea cables, revealing a severe lack of backup capacity for telecommunications. In addition, the Chinese government exerts long-term pressure on Taiwan through military exercises and information warfare. Taiwan’s air force maintenance is also highly dependent on foreign supply chains. Coupled with rising geopolitical risks, this highlights the vulnerability of both Taiwan’s economy and security. Therefore, Legislator Chen called for a comprehensive strategic framework that integrates military, energy, communication, and societal security, while encouraging youth engagement in national defense and civil service to enhance national resilience and crisis response capacity. He acknowledged that societal resilience needs more money and takes longer to create. With that being said, he emphasized that although the Ukraine’s success cannot be duplicated in Taiwan, lessons must be learned from the high price that the Ukrainians have paid. The floor was then open to all participants, including students, faculty and members of the community, to pose their own questions. The first question concerned how the state can handle or communicate with uncivil aspects of society. Senator Fischer answered the question by focusing on the concept of good citizenship. Citizenship is a set of skills, behaviors, and values that can be called upon in times of crisis. He referred to civilian resilience as a bottom-up process. For Legislator Chen, the answer depended on the active protection of the Constitution and democracy, where local media have a role to clarify and defend the truth. The questions and conversations that followed generally focused on the challenges of building civilian resilience in a shifting international order, and covered topics such as European collective defense, US-China rivalry, domestic budget cuts, and changing US priorities. Both Senator Fischer and Legislator Chen addressed these questions and looked for practical solutions that focused on building civilian capacity for adaptation. In conclusion, the lecture explored the need for societies to meet their strategic challenges in an increasingly uncertain international system. Through the fostering of civilian resilience, states such as the Czech Republic and Taiwan could strengthen government institutions to combat disinformation and diplomatic coercion. Students gained a deeper understanding of the realities and necessities for the development of civilian-led resilience efforts supported by the government. These discussions have not only underscored the importance of a “whole-of-nation” approach but have also opened doors for further questions and exploration.

National Chengchi University’s (NCCU) International Doctoral Program on Asia-Pacific Studies (IDAS) hosted a lecture by Dr. Florian Schneider, Chair Professor of Modern China at the Leiden Institute for Area Studies, Leiden University. His talk, entitled “China’s Viral Villages: Digital Nationalism in Times of Crisis,” given on April 8, 2025, disentangled crisis moments to shine a spotlight on how divided political opinions are across China, often along fault lines created by tribalist and nationalist attitudes. Schneider grounded this lecture by laying out how Nationalism gets filtered, transformed, and accelerated through digital networks. In the context of China, Schneider emphasized that the society is not monolithic, nor is the only actor the state, and argued that attitudes are shaped by many actors with their own agency, but that they use the same approved symbols of nationalism. The various types of nationalism interact in complicated ways, and, accordingly, the system can be understood as a complicated network where the government is a node in the process of information exchange, or a hierarchical system where the government oversees information platforms. As such processes unfold, Schneider provided examples of nationalist tactics in the digital environment and their application, but questioned the variation of experiences based on the platform environment. To understand the political complexities of nationalism in the 21st century, he asked: What happens to nationalism when it goes digital? How do platform societies work? To unpack this, Schneider introduced the concept of “viral villages”—distinct digital communities formed through recursive loops of shared sentiment and interaction. These villages are homogenized spaces that reinforce dominant narratives, often nationalistic in nature. Schneider analyzed Chinese nationalism through a network of platform mechanics and party-state influence. Overall, Schneider argued that digital media platforms are powerful tools for community construction, where states are powerful nodes in signaling the propriety and spread of nationalistic messaging. These “viral villages” illustrate how national solidarity and digital platforms can coalesce during times of crisis. In the open forum, the first set of probing questions from the students focused on the state’s interjection in nationalism and its effect on the construction of the “viral village.” Treating the state as an actor, Schneider discussed the complicated nature of the analysis in treating the state in China as the party, government, and the State all at the same time. This creates an overlap in the model, where nationalism has a narrow, parochial definition. The subsequent discussion touched on ethnic nationalism, censorship, and the effect of Chinese nationalism on international relations. Returning again to the concept of collapsing the party and the state, he expanded on understanding how the state as a node works within the local system, injecting these networks with their own values—a type of nationalism branded as patriotism, which is state-led. In conclusion, the lecture explored the crucial role of technology in political discourse and what it can tell us about the way in which different actors construct and manage nationalism in contemporary Chinese society and politics. Schneider provided students with insights into how popular nationalism is evolving today and how it might be connected to domestic and foreign policy in the PRC.